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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
What a shame 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of Yukos Oil, has finally been arrested by the 
Russian security services. The sinking feeling that comes from watching a cat 
play hand ball with its mouse-prey will pass, and Khodorkovsky will manage to 
find his way into exile, like Gusinsky and Berezovsky before him. After initial 
shock at the state's grab of his assets, the markets will stabilize, take stock of the 
price of oil and other extractable resources, and then judge Russia's investment-
worthiness. The few who will line up to defend the Yukos billionaire will do so 
without citing any action Khodorkovsky has taken more than two years in the 
past, sweeping away the crimes of the nineties with a "that was then" flick of the 
wrists. [As the FSB and Prosecutor's offices make public the "findings" of the 
searches that accompanied Khodorkovsky's arrest, even these voices may fade. 
(See WWW.INTERFAX/RU/E, 10 Oct 03, e.g., "Search at Yukos…produces 
impressive results.")] 
 
Like the embarrassing Kompromat wars of the Yel'tsin administration, this arrest 
reminds us all that the security services, despite all the changes of the past ten 
years, have not lost the ability to gather, process and deploy information. In the 
Yel'tsin years, the concern was the Korzhakov-Barsukov axis in the Kremlin. 
These days, there are so many entrées for the siloviki into the Putin 
administration that it more closely resembles a pincushion than a spit. The 
security men may well be attempting to flex their considerable muscle for a 
chance to satisfy their desires from the state coffers. At best one may hope that 
all they're looking for is a little self-indulgent spending and not a new power trip. 
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Platon Lebedev, Khodorkovsky's associate at Yukos, was transferred to the 
infamous Matrosskaya Tishina prison just prior to Khodorkovsky's detention 
there. In just the twelve short years since the break up of the Soviet Union, 
Matrosskaya Tishina has held many a fascinating detainee. Several of the 
August 1991 putshchisti were held at the jail for months before being granted 
amnesty. Vil Mirzayanov, the scientist-dissident who informed the world of 
Russia's chemical weapons program, spent time in Matrosskaya in 1994; several 
policemen, accused in a plot against Vladivostok Governor Viktor Cherepkov 
also saw the inside of this famous institution. The FSB held Ivan Orlov on 
terrorism charges at Matrosskaya after he blew up his car in the middle of Red 
Square in November 1998. Three Afghantsii were released from Matrosskaya 
Tishina in 2000 after being held for three years in connection with the 
Kotlyarskoye cemetery bombing that killed 14 persons and revealed a rumble for 
control of the lucrative Afghan War Veteran's Fund. Their confessions in the case 
were determined to have been coerced. Speaking of the Kompromat wars, 
former Justice Minister Valentin Kovalev (of sauna fame) was remanded to 
Matrosskaya on embezzlement charges after his fall from grace. He was 
released in 2000. In the battle for Media-MOST, Vladimir Gusinsky's Chief 
Financial Officer, Anton Titov, was tossed in Matrosskaya Tishina when Gusinsky 
slipped out of the country in the middle of "negotiations" for Gazprom to takeover 
Media-MOST. And now Khodorkovsky sits…. 
 
Personnel changes sans fanfare 
In an apparently related development, Aleksandr Voloshin resigned as Putin's 
Chief of Staff this week. He will be replaced by Putin Peterburger pal Dmitri 
Medvedev, who has been First Deputy Chief of the President's Staff since June 
2000. Medvedev's previous bailiwick included "cadre" appointments (up to the 
level of presidential adviser), labor contract negotiator and liaison with the 
Government apparatus. (ITAR-TASS, 30 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
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Dmitri Kozak has also moved up within the administration from a "Deputy Head" 
to a "First Deputy Head" of the administration, and Igor Shuvalov, formerly of the 
Government bureaucracy who moved to the Kremlin as Presidential adviser, will 
now be a "Deputy Head" of the Administration. (Ibid.) 
 
Both Medvedev and Kozak have been identified for several years as close 
confidantes of the President. Kozak, in recent years, has had the more high-
profile assignments, but Medvedev was believed to be a strong, if quiet, force 
within the administration. 
 
The murky Kremlin "debate" between the Siloviki and 'Family' members may 
finally be over. Some worry that Voloshin's continued presence in the Kremlin 
gave comfort to Family-connected moneymen. Instead of resigning when the 
security services went after Yukos and Lebedev, Voloshin held on, giving 
(perhaps) false hope to Khodorkovsky, who could have left the country and thus 
eluded capture given a clearer signal from Voloshin. (KOMMERSANT, 29 Oct 03, 
pp. 1,3; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
For the record, it appears that Voloshin will not, for the time being, jump from the 
Kremlin to the good ship UES. While Anatoli Chubais is rumored to have 
proposed Voloshin for a full-time position as Chairman of the Board, the Board of 
Directors decided to wait to consider the move. Don't rule it out in the future: With 
Chubais' 'empire through energy' scheme of expansion throughout former Soviet 
territory, the Board may need more full-time employees. 
 
Regional reaction 
Among those taking the cautious route of NOT commenting on the arrest of 
Khodorkovsky are Chukotka Autonomous District Governor Roman Abramovich, 
who claimed that he was "not thinking about this." (WWW.INTERFAX.RU/E, 29 
Oct 03, 12:33PM EST) Krasnoyarsk Territories Governor Aleksandr Khloponin 
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gave an equally equivocating response, stating that the rumored moves within 
the Kremlin if true would mean a "change in priorities." (Ibid.) 
 
Apparently, the governors caught wind of the hot topic around Government 
corridors: streamlining the procedure for dismissing governors. As Emergencies 
Minister Sergei Shoigu noted, the government should be able to dismiss regional 
governors "if a region actually goes bankrupt or when the irresponsible activity of 
governors leads to freezing in their regions during winter." 
(WWW.INTERFAX.RU/E, 31 Oct. 03, 630PM EST. For more on this issue see 
"Regions" report.) I guess the Governors better make sure they have a 
connection with the energy distributors, eh? 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Putin’s War Against Yukos & Mikhail Khodorkovsky. 
Yukos has been facing a concerted government attack since July of this year. At 
that time, a core Yukos shareholder, Platon Lebedev, was arrested and charged 
with stealing state property during a 1994 privatization deal. (THE MOSCOW 
TIMES, 22 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) In what may be an 
attempt to exert pressure, Lebedev, without the knowledge of his lawyer, was 
moved on 21 October from the "relatively comfortable" Lefortovo prison to a 
much more crowded, high security prison at Matrosskaya Tishina. (IZVESTIA 
PRESS DIGEST, 22 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Since Lebedev’s arrest in July, there had been little by way of a direct threat from 
the Federal Government–until two weeks ago. The first indication that a renewed 
government attack on Yukos was imminent was the arrest on 18 October by the 
FSB of a second Yukos core shareholder, Vasili Shakhonovsky. (THE MOSCOW 
TIMES, 22 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) His arrest was followed 
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by a raid on the St. Petersburg offices of Menatep-Sankt Peterburg bank, which 
has close ties to Yukos, (IZVESTIA PRESS DIGEST, 22 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) and an announcement from the Federal Prosecutor’s Office 
on 21 October, that the government intended to levy criminal charges against 
senior Yukos staff and would initiate a probe into the company’s oil licensing 
rights. (Ibid.) 
 
It seemed inevitable, in this atmosphere, that Yukos owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
would himself be the target of Federal action sooner rather than later. This has 
proven to be the case. On 25 October, Khodorkovsky was traveling on a private 
Yukos jet between Nizhnii Novgorod and Irkutsk, where he was due to give a 
speech at the Irkutsk School of Public Policy. (WPS, 27 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) The aircraft made an apparently planned stopover in 
Novosibirsk, Siberia, in order to refuel. Upon touching down, the jet was ordered 
to a secluded section of the airport, where it was surrounded by several trucks 
and buses with darkened windows. A special FSB commando squad then 
boarded the Yukos jet, and effected Khodorkovsky’s arrest. (WPS-RUSSIAN 
POLITICAL MONITOR, 27 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The Yukos boss was flown back to Moscow to be detained at Matrosskaya 
Prison. The Bassmannyy Intermunicipal Court in Moscow issued a warrant 
allowing the FSB to detain the oligarch for a period of two months. (ITAR-TASS, 
25 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1025 via World News Connection) Khodorkovsky 
has been charged with seven offences, including personal & corporate income 
tax evasion to the tune of $1 billion, fraud and forgery. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 
27 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Although the speaker of the Duma’s lower house, Gennady Seleznyov, stated on 
27 October, that he saw "no political aspects" (ITAR-TASS, FBIS-SOV-2003-
1027 via World News Connection), to Khodorkovsky’s arrest, it seems clear that 
the opposite is true. In 2000, soon after his succession to the Presidency, Putin is 
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believed to have agreed with Russia’s oligarchs not to attack them, in return for 
their assurance not to enter the political arena. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 29 Oct 
03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest can be linked to the oligarch’s criticism of Kremlin 
corruption during a televised February meeting with Putin, as well as his publicly 
stated intention to back several Duma factions that are not tied to the President. 
(THE MOSCOW TIMES, 27 Oct 03, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) More 
importantly, it is a central part of the Siloviki (the so-called St. Petersburgers and 
former FSB colleagues of the President) campaign to oust the remnants of 
President Yel'tsin's clan. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 2 Nov 03, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The importance of the FSB’s role in Khodorkovsky’s arrest should not be 
underestimated. But Russia’s press has once again missed, or more likely 
avoided, making the important point. Both The Moscow Times and the Russian 
Political Monitor have published pieces purporting that Putin has "become a 
hostage to the Kremlin’s dominant clan: the ex-KGB people, the chekists." (WPS-
RUSSIAN POLITICAL MONITOR, 31 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Media naïveté is even more glaring in the face of further FSB action: 
on 27 October, Anatoli Chubais, CEO of Unified Energy Systems, and Duma 
candidate for the Union of Right Forces spoke out against Khodorkovsky’s arrest, 
warning that President Putin risked an open war between himself and big 
business. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 27 Oct 03 via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Retribution came three days later, on October 30, in the form of an 
FSB raid and search action, lasting over thirteen hours, on the offices of 
Novosibirskenergo, which is a subsidiary of UES. (BBC MONITORING, 31 
October 2003, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Clearly, the raid was 
intended as a warning to Chubais and his remaining colleagues to toe the line–or 
else face the same fate as Khodorkovsky. 
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Khodorkovsky's arrest and the actions against Yukos and UES are such serious 
moves, that it is inconceivable that the orders did not come directly from 
President Putin. To argue that Putin is being manipulated by, or is beholden to 
the FSB is a dangerous misreading of the situation as it currently stands in 
Russia. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
 
Russian Foreign Ministry holds back investments in Iraq 
Prior to the Madrid conference on 23 and 24 October to discuss the restructuring 
of Iraq and to consolidate the world community’s intentions to donate financially 
and otherwise to the reconstruction of Iraq, the Russian Foreign Ministry laid out 
its conditions for Russian investment towards rebuilding the country. In a letter 
published in RIA Novosti on 21 October (via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) #7379, 
22 Oct 03) Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Fedetov declared Moscow’s 
dissatisfaction with the situation so far, making a plea to the new Iraqi 
government to honor previous agreements (under Saddam Hussein) with the 
Russian Federation and drawing the line on Russian donations and investments 
to Iraq. 
 
In the letter, Fedetov sets out a case to win support for Russia by claiming that 
the Madrid conference wouldn’t even be taking place were it not for Russia’s key 
role in achieving the compromise necessary to pass United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1511. Despite Russia’s support for the resolution, he 
explains, Moscow still prefers more clear-cut provisions for reaching a political 
settlement in Baghdad and a more active role for the U.N. 
 
In Fedetov’s list of grievances one finds what seems truly important to the 
Kremlin—opportunity for Russian business in Iraq. Fedetov makes four specific 
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complaints: no reliable security conditions exist; economic activity in Iraq lacks 
transparency and the rules for foreign investors are unclear; continuity of 
previous arrangements is necessary (i.e., previous Russian deals must be 
upheld, and Russian companies must be given priority); and an unbiased 
organization to supervise the activities of the Iraq restoration fund still needs to 
be established. Additionally, Fedetov expresses his discontent towards the report 
published by the U.N. Development Group and World Bank which does not 
clarify the areas of top priority investment and does not cover the oil industry. 
 
Fedetov further explains that Russian companies will not make their investments 
in Iraq, potentially worth billions of dollars, unless the returns on previous 
Russian-Iraqi contracts are guaranteed. The deputy foreign minister is referring, 
in particular, to LUKoil’s 1997 40-year production sharing contract with the 
previous Baghdad regime, valued at between $7 and $15 billion; in the months 
prior to the war, however, Saddam Hussein declared the deal void. Fedetov is 
also attempting to persuade the new Iraqi government that Russian business 
investments will be better for Iraq in the long term than any one-time donations 
that emerge from Madrid. Russia, too, understands how profitable their 
investments could be in Iraq and has even expressed a willingness to write off 
some of the $8 billion debt that Iraq owes to Moscow for the Soviet Union’s 
previous support to the regime which mostly took the form of military hardware. 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (AFP), 21 Oct 03 via JRL #7378, 21 Oct 03) 
 
At the Madrid conference , Fedetov described Russia’s potential investments in 
Iraq as totaling up to $4 billion, mostly consisting of plans for developing the 
Western Qurna 2 and Garraf oilfields, and he maintained his position not to 
commit to any investments until Moscow receives guarantees that old contracts 
will remain valid and Russian companies will receive priority consideration. 
Russia has informed Baghdad of this policy in a number of different fora. (RIA 
NEWS AGENCY, 21 Oct 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
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Moscow can only dangle this threat for so long until the opportunities for 
investment are gone. Thus, when Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stressed 
the Kremlin’s insistence for a timetable to be established by 15 December for 
handing over authority to an Iraqi government, (ITAR-TASS, 28 Oct 03, BBC 
Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Russia was angling to obtain a 
ruling body in Baghdad that will be more willing to do business with Russia and 
less influenced by the United States. 
 
Putin’s visit to Pope important for Russia’s foreign relations 
A key element of Russia’s quest to regain its leadership position in the world 
community has been President Vladimir Putin’s interaction with the Muslim world, 
specifically his recent efforts to become a member of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference. Pronouncing the size of the Muslim population within Russia 
as larger than that of some Muslim countries, Putin is seeking the many potential 
benefits of warm relations with the oil-rich Islamic nations of the world. If relations 
with the Muslims to Russia’s south are important to Russia’s future, then 
evidently so are relations with the Catholics to Russia’s west, and with this 
doubtlessly in mind, President Putin has announced that he will visit Pope John 
Paul II at the Vatican in November. 
 
Relations between Moscow and the Vatican have been sour. The Russian 
Orthodox Church has charged the Vatican with proselytizing among the Orthodox 
populations of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. (AFP, 16 Oct 03 via 
Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) #7372, 17 Oct 03) In late 2002 - early 2003 the 
Russian government expelled six Roman Catholic priests from Russia for 
"activities that are incompatible with their condition as priests." 
(WWW.ZENIT.ORG-AVVENIRE, 18 Feb 03 via JRL #7067, 19 Feb 03) The 
sixth, Father Bronislaw Czaplicki, a Polish Catholic priest, reportedly was 
proposing to canonize Catholic martyrs from the Soviet era. (AFP, 24 Feb 03 via 
JRL #7075, 24 Feb 03) Moscow thus claimed to feel 'besieged' when the Vatican 
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moved to upgrade the church’s structure in Russia by establishing four dioceses 
there. 
 
Despite reports that Vatican-Russian relations improved following the arrival in 
Moscow of the Vatican’s new envoy, Archbishop Antonio Mennini, in November 
2002, (WWW.ZENIT.ORG—AVVENIRE, 17 Feb 03 via JRL #7067, 18 Feb 03) 
Mennini has been treated coolly by his Russian hosts. Talks between Mennini 
and Patriarch Aleksei II, in February 2003 were reported by the Russian 
Orthodox Church as "doing nothing" to improve relations. (AFP, 24 Feb 03 via 
JRL #7075, 24 FEB 03) In March, while in the city of Tula, the Archbishop was 
denied entry into a 19th century Catholic chapel and not allowed to visit the 
historic home of Leo Tolstoy, and his requests to call on the oblast’s governor 
and the city mayor were rejected. (TVS, 3 Mar 03 via RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 7 
No. 41, Part I, 4 Mar 03) 
 
The front against the Catholic Church, however, appears to be led by the 
Russian Orthodox hierarchy and not by the Kremlin. Putin, who has visited the 
pope several times, has expressed hope repeatedly for improved relations 
between the Orthodox community and the Holy See and has most recently stated 
his intention to discuss bilateral relations and international affairs during his visit 
with the pontiff. Although the president has even stated the usefulness of a papal 
visit to Russia, he claims that he is hamstrung by the Orthodox Church’s 
unwillingness to welcome the Catholic leader. (RFE/RL Vol. 4, No. 38, 25 Sep 
03) 
 
Meanwhile, Archbishop Mennini continues his work in Russia and was recently in 
Kazan to consecrate the site on which the first Catholic cathedral in Tatarstan is 
to be built. While there, he reminded the Russians that the Vatican still holds a 
trump card in its tussle with the Orthodox Church — the Kazan Mother of God 
Icon, which was formerly housed in the cathedral of the Kazan Mother of God in 
Petrograd from where it was taken abroad in the 1920s; eventually it came into 
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the possession of the Vatican and is situated in the Pope’s apartments. Mennini 
stated that the time and place for handing over the icon "will depend on the 
achievement of an agreement between the Holy See and the Russian Orthodox 
Church." (ITAR-TASS, 31 Oct 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
OSCE plans to discuss status of Russian forces in Georgia 
The Georgian news agency Kavkasia Press has reported that the Organization 
for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) plans to discuss the issue of 
Russian troop withdrawal from Georgia at its 1-2 December 2003 meeting of 
foreign ministers in Maastrich, the Netherlands. (22 Oct 03; What the Papers Say 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Russia broke its promise made during a 
1999 OSCE summit to remove forces from Georgia. Tbilisi now wants Russia to 
remove its troops from the bases at Akhalkalaki and Batumi within three years, 
but Russia insists it needs eleven years. Having gone unpunished thus far, 
Russia may be expected again to attempt having its way with Georgia. 
 
It is unlikely, first of all, that Moscow will be in the mood to bow to any demands 
made of it at an OSCE forum following the organization’s recent decision not to 
observe the elections in Chechnya, thus diminishing the perception of those 
elections’ legitimacy. Secondly, given the strong arm tactics the European Union 
has been using to try to persuade the Kremlin to raise domestic oil prices by 
threatening Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (W.T.O.) and 
the equally obdurate response from Russian President Vladimir Putin (ITAR-
TASS, 9 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1009 via World News Connection) no solid 
promises regarding Russian troop withdrawal from Georgia may be expected at 
the December meeting. 
 
Georgia would like to have Russian forces off its territory before 2006 or 2007 
when it hopes to receive an invitation to join the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 18 Apr 03; What the Papers Say 
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via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Indeed, to prevent this very event, Russia 
may want to stall as long as it can on removing its presence from Georgia. 
Russia bristles at the idea of putative NATO bases in Georgia. 
 
Despite U.S. military assistance to and presence in Georgia, Moscow seems, for 
the moment, to have the upper hand in the struggle for dominance in Georgia; it 
is in complete control of Georgia’s gas and electricity resources, and Russian 
forces move freely across the border on the pretense of hunting Chechen 
fighters. A Russian military presence also helps Russia maintain control over 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
 
Russia finds itself under watchful eyes due to recent developments that resound 
of Russian imperialism—a claim to have the right to defend ethnic Russians and 
Russian speakers anywhere, the announcement of a new "preemptive military 
doctrine," the recent establishment of the Single Economic Space, and the 
attempt to jeopardize Ukraine's territorial integrity with encroachments near the 
Tuzla spit in the Sea of Azov. The concerns of European Union foreign ministers 
are likely to be reinforced if Moscow continues to drag its feet on withdrawing 
forces from Georgia. 
 
For Russia the stakes in Georgia are too great to expect that it will budge. 
Georgia is part of the new front line in the struggle for hegemony in Eurasia, and 
the toothless OSCE is hardly the forum in which to put any real pressure on 
Moscow. A serious strategy for the use of leverage-tools by the European foreign 
ministers and perhaps promises regarding NATO’s intentions in Georgia will be 
required if they expect to influence Russia to make concessions there. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
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By Kate Martin 
 
MEDIA 
And the winner is... 
The Constitutional Court took away an important tool for the suppression of press 
freedoms last week, deciding that vague wording in a section of the amended 
Law on Elections rendered that section—affecting media coverage of 
candidates—invalid. 
 
Ruling on an appeal submitted by three media outlets (Ekho Moskvy, Rodnaya 
gazeta and Svetlogorye), the Court decided that several provisions of Article 48 
of the federal law "On the Main Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to 
Participate in a Referendum of the Citizens of the Russian Federation" inhibited 
the dissemination of information that voters needed. (A group of 104 Duma 
deputies had submitted a similar complaint.) The guidelines provided in the 
amended law "allow for a broad interpretation" of "campaigning," and, therefore, 
the possibility of the "arbitrary application of these guidelines," the Court ruled. 
(ITAR-TASS, 30 Oct 03 via Johnson’s Russia List #7391) 
 
The Constitutional Court differentiated between propaganda and election 
reporting, filling a gap that had allowed for abuse of the law, and tightening the 
definition of "campaigning." Moreover, the media are no longer prevented from 
providing positive or negative assessments of candidates’ activities. "Elections 
can be free only when freedom of information and the citizens' free expression of 
their will are assured," said Constitutional Court Chairman Valeri Zorkin. 
(WWW.GAZETA.RU/ENGLISH, 30 Oct 03) 
 
Now the onus appears to be on prosecutors, who have to prove that a journalist’s 
intent was specifically to influence voters via propaganda. Prior to the Court 
decision, several attacks had been launched on media, using the broad definition 
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of "pre-election campaigning" in the elections law, to stifle the dissemination of 
any information about the candidates. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 22 Oct 03) 
 
Such a definition, the Court ruled, was "incompatible with judicial equality, [and] 
limit[ed] the freedom of public information and the rights of citizens to receive 
information to vote as they wish in the elections." (WWW.MOSCOWTIMES.COM, 
31 Oct 03) 
 
Reaction to the ruling was mixed. Alexei Venediktov of Ekho Moskvy sounded 
victorious: "We got what we wanted." However, others, such as Alexei Simonov 
of the Glasnost Foundation, warned that the ruling came too late to halt the 
damage inflicted by the media’s self-censorship due to the law. (Ibid.) The 
beginning of the election campaign period on 7 November should provide 
evidence on whether Simonov’s pessimism is warranted. Yet a truly chilling effect 
may be suffered by the voters who witnessed the media muzzle themselves in 
the face of government intervention in the electoral process. How much Russian-
style democracy can the electorate withstand? 
 
REGIONS 
Less job security for governors 
In an indication that the emergencies ministry likely won’t be accepting the 
responsibility for any...um ... emergencies, the government information 
department announced that Moscow is examining the procedure whereby 
governors are removed from power. The announcement came in response to a 
comment by Minister (and parliamentary candidate) Sergei Shoigu that the 
ouster process should be simplified. (INTERFAX, 31 Oct 03 via 
www.moscowtimes.com) The goal apparently is to allow the removal of a 
governor if "a region actually goes bankrupt, or when the irresponsible activity of 
governors leads to freezing in their regions during winter," the department said. 
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The heating crisis that affected much of Russia last winter-in which hundreds of 
persons died and thousands more required hospitalization—clearly remains on 
the minds of many these days, as the weather turns brisk. To be sure, criminal 
charges were brought against some regional authorities for misuse of funds. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1206 GMT, 14 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0114 via World News 
Connection) None of the cases resulted in convictions for regional authorities, 
however. A similar scenario is being played out this year: Kamchatka Governor 
Mikhail Mashkovtsev and his deputy, Vladimir Skvortsov, and Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatsky Mayor Yuri Golenishev are facing charges for existing heating 
crises. (MOSCOW TIMES, 29 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Yet, while official malfeasance is a cause for concern, the bigger culprits appear 
to be the high costs of fuel (both new and accrued charges) and aging and often 
obsolete supply systems and pipes. Regional budgets simply cannot handle the 
tremendous cost such overhauls would require. The federal government seems 
unwilling to lend too much assistance either; rather, Moscow already is devoting 
energy to covering its own assets by pointing the finger at this year’s scapegoats. 
 
Interestingly, Moscow has found at least a partial solution to the problem, for 
some. The Federal Energy Commission announced its decision to reduce electric 
costs for individuals in five areas in Russia -- Sverdlovsk, Nizhni Novgorod, Perm 
and Leningrad regions, and in St. Petersburg. (RosBusinessConsulting, 31 Oct 
03 via www.moscowtimes.com) Those regions were not the only areas affected 
by last year’s crisis and are unlikely to be the only areas affected this winter. 
Indeed, the federal government has described the existing situation as "critical" in 
Kamchatka, the Koryak Autonomous Region and Ulyanovsk Province, and 
"serious" in Altai, Tuva, and Ivanovo, Chita and Sakhalin provinces. (IZVESTIA, 
12 Sep 03; Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press via Lexis-Nexis) Only a cynic 
would compare the number of voters in the regions getting assistance with the 
areas that will get no help…. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Kris Beasly, USAF and Paul Lyons 
 
Russia Returns? 
In what Russian President Vladimir Putin called a "landmark event," for the first 
time in its 13-year history, the Russian Federation opened a new airbase outside 
its own territory (ITAR-TASS 23 Oct 03, 0840 GMT; FBIS-SOV-2003-1023 via 
World News Connection). [The Russian Federation has maintained military 
bases in other republics, in the form of Border Guards and "garrisons," as well as 
establishing a new presence, in some cases, under the guise of "Peacekeeping 
Forces" — Ed.] In a formal ceremony on 23 October 03, attended by President 
Putin, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, the Defense and Foreign Ministers of both 
countries, the Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(ODKB) and numerous other national and local officials, Russia took formal 
control of a large air base in the Kyrgyz town of Kant, near the capital of Bishkek. 
(ITAR-TASS 23 Oct 03, 0718, 0840 and 0956 GMT; FBIS-SOV-2003-1023 via 
World News Connection). 
 
The creation of this Russian air base in Central Asia constitutes a significant 
development in view of the constant discussion of the need for contraction of 
Russia's military services and the fact that, in some areas, Russia was compelled 
to implement major redeployment, not only from its former East European 
satellites but from the three former Soviet Baltic Republics. In other places 
Russia has had to start complying, albeit at a glacial pace, with international 
pressure to withdraw its military presence, such as from Transdniestr and from 
one or two of its four "garrisons" in Georgia. Viewed as a single period, the 
fourteen years since the end of the USSR have seen the redeployment of military 
and civilian personal plus dependents, numbering hundreds of thousands, as 
well as many thousands of weapons, from ICBMs to AK47s, and a vast amount 
of ammunition. (KAVKASIA-PRESS (Internet version) 25 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-
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2003-1025 and CHISINAU BASAPRESS 24 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1024 both 
via World News Connection) But last month, in a mountainous country of central 
Asia, the process has been reversed. While a minor event militarily, this new 
"permanent" forward deployment of aircraft and troops outside its own frontier is 
a significant emotional, political and diplomatic event for Russia. 
 
According to President Putin, it was President Akayev who proposed the 
development of the air base and smoothed the way for its creation through the 
Kyrgyz governmental bureaucracy. An initial agreement was signed in December 
2002 and construction started soon after. A final agreement, for a 15 year lease 
with automatic five year extensions by mutual agreement, was signed 22 
September 03 during President Akayev’s last visit to Moscow. (RUSSIA 
JOURNAL (www.russiajournal.com) 15 Oct 03 & EURASIA INSIGHT 
(www.eurasianet.org), 24 Jul 03 & ITAR-TASS 23 Oct 03, 0956 GMT; FBIS-
SOV-2003-1023 via World News Connection) 
 
According to Colonel-General Esen Topoyev, the Kyrgyz Minister of Defense, 
Russia has already invested more than 70 million Rubles [approximately $2.5 
million] upgrading the runway, buildings, and grounds in the "air base military 
encampment alone." He also stated that if, "radio-technological equipment 
[presumably radar, weather and navigational aids] were factored in, the figure 
would increase two or threefold." (ITAR-TASS 23 Oct 03, 0924 GMT; FBIS-SOV-
2003-1023 via World News Connection) The key word here is "upgraded," not 
built from scratch, because Kant is not a new base at all, nor is it unknown to 
many in today’s Russian Air Force. During WWII, because it was far beyond the 
range of the Luftwaffe’s bombers, the USSR used it to train more than 1,500 
pilots. And from 1945 until the early 1990s, Soviet Pilot School #5 trained 
thousands of Soviet pilots as well as hundreds of pilots from 54 other countries 
that bought or were given Soviet military aircraft. (ITAR-TASS 23 Oct 03, 0956 
GMT; FBIS-SOV-2003-1023 via World News Connection) 
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In fact, the base is ideal for the Russians, because it has a superb runway, 
certified to ICAO standards' for almost any plane in the Russian military (or 
commercial) fleets. Since September, Russia has bedded down five Su-27 multi-
role fighters, five Su-25 ground attack aircraft (similar to American A-10s), six IL-
76 jet cargo planes, one IL-18 and one An-24 turboprop transport aircraft, one 
An-12 light utility plane and two Mi-8 transport helicopters. In addition, for 
reasons not yet clear, Kyrgyzstan turned over its only combat capable aircraft, 
four L-39 Czech-made trainers equipped to carry a few bombs on wing hard 
points, to the Russians. With these few aircraft, there is plenty of ramp space left 
open. (Note: although not mentioned in open sources, it seems highly likely that 
Russia has deployed at least one SAM battery to Kant as well, probably of the 
recent S-300 variety.) The 500-person Russian unit, commanded by Lt Col 
Andrei Samotsvet, will report to the Fifth Air Force and Air Defense Army within 
the Volga-Urals Military District and will employ about 200 Kyrgyz local personnel 
in various service and support positions. (RIA NOVOSTI (www.en.rian.ru), 22 Oct 
03 and MOSCOW MAYAK Radio, 16 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1016 via World 
News Connection) 
 
The force that recently moved to Kant is not large, but it offers the Russians 
capabilities far beyond the limited aircraft there at present. By establishing the 
base and bedding down maintenance and support forces there, hiring local 
personnel and upgrading the airfield itself (runways, navigational and landing 
aids, fuel storage, etc.), it will be so much easier in the future to expand rapidly 
the number and type of aircraft based there. In fact, the ability to expand is much 
more important than the current capability. Russian Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov said as much when he noted during the opening ceremonies, "We should 
make sure that we could step up our military presence in the shortest possible 
time." (ITAR-TASS 23 Oct 03, 0920 GMT; FBIS-SOV-2003-1023 via World News 
Connection) Russia plans to give the first group of airmen and aircraft some time 
this winter and in the spring to get properly bedded down, and then, in Ivanov’s 
words, "…to make sure that the air base at Kant is fully operational" by 
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conducting a large joint (multi-service) and combined (multi-national) exercise 
with Kyrgyz and Russian ground forces. (Ibid.) Perhaps because he was 
speaking to a mainly Kyrgyz audience at Kant, Ivanov pointed out twice that the 
deployment of Russian ground forces for the exercise would be "only for a short 
period." (Ibid.) 
 
So what is the nature of this new bastion of military might? President Putin, 
Kyrgyz Defense Minister Topoyev and others announced that the purpose is to 
establish an airbase to provide air support to the Collective Rapid Reaction 
Forces of the Collective Treaty Security Organization (ODKB), which, since its 
origins in 1992, has included Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus 
and Tajikistan. In fact, Putin stated, "…the base will lend an entirely new military 
and political significance to [ODKB]" and that "…by creating this aviation shield, 
we intend to strengthen security in the region, whose stability is becoming an 
increasingly significant factor influencing the development of the international 
situation." (ITAR-TASS, 21 Oct 03, 1028 GMT; FBIS-SOV-2003-1021 and ITAR-
TASS, 23 Oct 03, 0840 GMT; FBIS-SOV-2003-1023 both via World News 
Connection) Under the agreement, the Russian Ministry of Defense controls 
combat readiness, organizational and personnel structures and everyday base 
operations, while the Kyrgyz provide communications services, electricity, water 
and other support, and create conditions for normal work at the base. Although 
constituted as a "Russian" base, the militaries of other ODKB members will be 
allowed also to stay at the base. And a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was 
included, granting Russian military troops and their property full immunity from 
search, seizure and taxation (WWW.RUSSIAJOURNAL.COM 15 Oct 03) 
 
President Putin makes the case that Kant is different, but compatible with the 
coalition air base (formally know as Ganci Air Base), at Manas, Bishkek’s 
international airport. Initially, many international observers were amazed when 
Kyrgyzstan allowed the anti-Taliban coalition, led by the U.S., to begin using 
Ganci Air Base to stage forces into Afghanistan, and later to fly combat missions 
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from there. In hindsight, Putin’s desire to join the anti-terrorism coalition in 2001, 
along with U.S. incentives, enabled the Kyrgyz to open the base to outsiders. 
Today, Putin emphasizes that Kant is permanent, while Manas has been set up 
for the specific task of fighting terrorism in Afghanistan and will be closed down 
again when that mission is deemed complete. According to him, "The Russian air 
base will be fulfilling other tasks; it will ensure the security of Kyrgyzstan and the 
whole large region" acting as a deterrent to terrorists and extremists "…of every 
stripe." He also ties that mission to one on Russian soil, stating, "The fight 
against terrorism is our domestic policy task," once again linking himself to that 
worthy cause, referring, of course, to Chechnya. (ITAR-TASS, 23 Oct 03, 0840 
GMT; FBIS-SOV-2003-1023) Interestingly, coalition operations at Manas have 
been reduced recently to resupply and refueling tasks into and over Afghanistan, 
while the Dutch and Danish F-16 fighters have returned home. (BBC Monitoring 
International Reports, 2 Oct 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The bottom line is that Russia has enhanced significantly its ability to deploy 
military air and land power to this key republic and region. But for what purpose? 
Imperial expansion? To improve domestic security? To counter the expansion of 
U.S. and multi-national coalition facilities in the region? Simply to cement the 
Kyrgyz military and the Russian military? Or a combination of the above? 
 
This effort and similar ones elsewhere: Most notably Russia’s effort to convert 
the 201st Motorized Rifle (Infantry) Division, currently in Tajikistan, into a 
permanent military base (RIA NOVOSTI, www.en.rian.ru, 4 Nov 03) constitute a 
response to all of the above. Russia is working hard to regain both the perception 
and reality of its ability to project power into the Central Asia region. Obviously, 
the Russians seek to counter U.S. and NATO influence in Central Asia, that has 
grown since the immediate post-11 September 01 efforts. The Russian military 
clearly is bonding with the Kyrgyz military (witness the transfer of the L-39 aircraft 
and the defense of Kyrgyz airspace to Russia). While Russia gains, it seems that 
Kyrgyzstan and the region also may be gaining security from the destabilizing 
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forces to the south, such as radical Muslim fundamentalists, nacre-traffickers and 
other undesirable elements. It is a concern that Russia will dominate ODKB 
much more than the U.S. ever dominated NATO, for the simple reasons that 
Russia is so much bigger militarily, politically and economically than the other 
members, and Russia is breathing over the shoulder of each of these countries, 
while a wide ocean separates the U.S. from most of NATO. (EURASIA INSIGHT 
(www.eurasianet.org), 1 Oct 03) 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Dept of Defense or the United 
States government. 
 
NAVY 
Military Doctrine...Rift or Reason 
As covered in the last segment of the NIS Observed, Russia's new military 
doctrine articulated what most analysts would conclude are dramatic departures. 
Most notably, the new military doctrine provides for more far-flung action and 
great 'flexibility' than previous post-Soviet pronouncements, especially 
concerning the right of pre-emptive strike, the right to engage military forces in 
regions of former-Soviet territory (CIS) in order to secure state-interests 
(oil/energy) and the affirmation that Russia's nuclear arsenal remains a viable 
deterrent, all of which have fueled international debate, comment and concern 
over Russia's regional and global partnerships. 
 
Russia has attempted to substantiate the offensive aspects of the new military 
doctrine by claiming that its evolution has resulted from external factors. First and 
foremost is NATO. The Defense Ministry has alleged that "Moscow may rethink 
its nuclear strategy in response to NATO's 'offensive military doctrine'." 
(WWW.MOSCOWTIMES.COM, 28 Oct 03) This includes NATO's courting of new 
members in Central and Eastern Europe including three former Soviet republics 
in the Baltic area. General Yuri Baluyevskiy, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the 
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Russian Armed Forces recently told Rossiyskaya gazeta (cited by INTERFAX 31 
Oct 03; BBC Worldwide Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) that "it is 
not possible to fully rule out the possibility of war with a NATO country, but a war 
with NATO would be Russia's death." Second to NATO, is the deteriorating 
relationship with Ukraine and Georgia. Intrinsic to that problem are Russian oil 
pipelines, economic interests and the claim that Georgia is playing a hand in the 
Chechen resistance. Third, the United States' use of preemptive force under the 
aegis of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in Iraq and Afghanistan is taken 
by Russia's military planners as a defensive measure through offensive means. 
 
Obviously, the military doctrine has spawned wide-scale debate and analysis. 
One source has posited that the new doctrine fails to discuss "Russia's current 
military problems...the military seem to have convinced Putin to copy the United 
States." (COPENHAGEN POLITIKEN, 22 Oct 03; FBIS-WEU-2003-1022 via 
World News Connection). In addition, Novaya gazeta (29 Oct 03; What the 
Paper's Say via ISI Emerging Markets Database) has assessed the new doctrine 
as "a recipe for confrontation with the United States, NATO, terrorists and 
neighboring countries." 
 
Stirring further debate and reaction, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, during an 
interview with Moskovsky Komsomolets (cited at WWW.MOSCOWTIMES.COM, 
28 Oct 03) responded to a question about the United States by saying, "No one 
fully understands it...[It's]...just as well [that] the Americans don’t know exactly 
who the Russians are...it's been stated they aren't an enemy, but they aren't 
allies either, that's for sure." Therein lies the landscape—a new doctrine that 
redefines vital tenets of the use of force and a diplomatic canvas clouded by 
Russia's domestic intrigues and imprecise foreign intentions. 
 
Two's Company 
In concert with perceptions of renewed Russian "imperialism" within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia's opening of its Kant 
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Airbase in Kyrgyzstan is being viewed by many as a move to shift the balance of 
power in the region. Under the auspices of the CIS' Collective Security Treaty, 
the airbase is said to "strengthen security in the region, whose stability is 
becoming an increasingly significant factor influencing the development of 
international situation...[and will] boost security in the region by deterring 
terrorists and extremists of all kinds." (ITAR-TASS, 23 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
1021 via World News Connection) 
 
With the presence of a U.S.-led coalition airbase at Manas only 20 miles away, 
one could conclude that the Kant Airbase's establishment (and Russia's first new 
military installation on foreign soil since the fall of the Soviet Union) is anything 
but coincidental. With dwindling numbers of coalition forces in Manas, and U.S. 
attention focused elsewhere, it is plausible that Russia is bolstering its hand in 
yet another Central Asian state. 
 
Stemming the Tide... 
Russian construction of a sea dyke that would effectively link Russian soil to the 
strategic island of Tuzla stirred an eddy of tense diplomatic posturing and 
potential military conflict. At issue is the island of Tuzla which lies amidst the 
Kerch Strait and which has been viewed as part of Ukraine since the USSR's 
break-up. The area's strategic value lies in the fact that the Kerch Strait offers the 
only outlet from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea and is situated along a border 
that Russia views as unresolved (despite its recognition of Ukrainian borders). 
 
The Russian dyke-building attempt has been viewed by Kiev as a "blatant land-
grab." [Consequently Kiev] "began to stage small-scale military maneuvers in the 
area." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 30 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Russian-
Ukrainian contacts have avoided further exacerbation of the situation. Ukrainian 
border guards remain poised to prevent further Russian encroachment. [See 
additional coverage of this issue under "Ukraine"] 
 
 24 
The Tuzla sovereignty issue has potentially far reaching consequences for 
Ukraine. In discussions over putative NATO membership, Ukraine's territorial 
dispute will stall any pursuit of acceptance into NATO. "Under NATO's statutory 
documents, the political demands of the countries striving for membership in the 
alliance include, among other things, the settlement of external territorial 
controversies." (RFE/FL NEWSLINE Vol. 7. No. 206, Part II, 30 Oct 03). 
Significant is the fact that Russia commenced its sea dyke construction 
immediately after the Ukraine-E.U. summit in Yalta. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
MOLDOVA 
Back under Communist control? 
The Moldovan Parliamentary majority voted in favor of a draft law that would 
liquidate the Moldovan state-owned broadcasting company Teleradio-Moldova, 
restructure it and then reopen it as a public company. The move came as a result 
of pressure by the Council of Europe, which strongly advised Moldova to 
democratize its media in order to ensure a greater plurality of views. The 
company's new President, Artur Efremov, expressed hope that the public 
ownership will increase operational efficiency and profitability of the company 
and will make programs more interesting. (BASAPRESS NEWS AGENCY 15 Oct 
03; BBC MONITORING, 16 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Despite the seemingly noble intentions of this move, many argue that the draft 
law is a convenient excuse to bring the company under Communist Party control 
and eliminate those employees of Teleradio-Moldova who do not support the 
party. It is estimated that anywhere from 500 to 850 employees, out of 1,320, will 
be fired by the management. (BASAPRESS NEWS AGENC 22 Oct 03; BBC 
MONITORING, 22 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) This move could be a reaction to last 
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year's strikes carried out by journalists in Chisinau, who protested against 
governmental censorship (the protest was also censored). There have been 
attempts to silence those Teleradio-Moldova journalists, who showed solidarity 
with the protesters. 
 
Another reason for liquidating the company is allegedly the troubling financial 
situation that has developed under the past management. According to the voted 
amendments, Teleradio-Moldova will be relieved of the debts it has accumulated 
to date — a very convenient way to hide the embezzlement of public funds. The 
company has accumulated 1.4 million dollar debt during the two years of being 
managed by the directors appointed by the Communist Party. No wonder! 
(INFOTAG, 24 Oct 03; FBIS-2003-1024 via World News Connection) 
 
The Council of Europe has voiced its disapproval of this development, accusing 
the Communist Party of attempting to bring Teleradio-Moldova under its control. 
This is not the first time the government of Moldova has attempted to restrict the 
activities of the Moldovan media. In 2002, broadcasting licenses were withdrawn 
from several radio stations for violating broadcasting regulations. Bessarabia's 
Voice was one of them. The station carried newscasts of foreign stations such as 
the BBC, Voice of America and RFE/RL. (INFOPROD, 18 Nov 02 via Lexis-
Nexis) In June 2003, the journalists voiced their concern that the new Criminal 
and Civil Codes, which came into effect this summer, were threatening freedom 
of speech. The new Criminal Code contains an article on libel, which carries a 
mandatory sentence of up to five years imprisonment. Journalists consider this 
article a warning shot. The new Civil Code also does not specify the maximum 
compensation an author should pay if a court finds him or her guilty of libel, 
(BASAPRESS NEWS AGENCY 14 Jun 03; BBC MONITORING, 12 June 03 via 
Lexis-Nexis) creating an even more uncertain atmosphere. 
 
BELARUS 
Unfulfilled Promises 
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Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenka once again waxed optimistic about 
the Russian-Belarussian Union on October 24, 2003. In particular, the President 
expressed his confidence that the Russian ruble will become the sole legal 
tender in Belarus by January 1, 2005. His hopes have turned out so often to be 
unfounded however, that it seems that few still trust his words. The introduction 
of Russian-Belarussian non-cash settlements was supposed to take effect on 
July 1, 2003, but it was delayed for "technical reasons." On October 1, 2003 an 
attempt to approve an agreement introducing the ruble as the single currency 
failed yet again…for technical reasons. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov 
expressed his doubts that the single currency would come into effect in Belarus 
by January 1, 2005 unless all the necessary documents were signed and ratified 
before the end of 2003. With Lukashenka's ability to uncover a plethora of 
"technical difficulties," the chances that this deadline will be met are small 
indeed. 
 
Lukashenka has become very adroit at evading his promises. His claim to 
establish an export consortium by July 1 of this year has not been honored; 
neither has he done anything to encourage Russian investors in Belarus, as he 
assured the Russian side he would. The Baltika brewery, which invested over 
$10 million into production facilities was forced to leave Belarus. The partnership 
with Surgutneft also failed and Russian news broadcasts are no longer permitted 
on the territory of Belarus. (WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, 15 Oct 03 via Lexis-
Nexis) What kind of Union are we talking about if Lukashenka is going out of his 
way to promote anti-Russian sentiment in Belarus? 
 
To complicate matters further, Lukashenka is requiring compensation from 
Russia for giving up the Belarussian currency, $500 million to be precise. He is 
also demanding an increase in gas deliveries at Russian domestic prices. 
(VEDOMOSTI 29 Aug 03;WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, 29 Aug 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
These demands clearly infuriated Kasianov: "I do not know what kind of 
compensation can there be for introducing the currency! Introducing the Russian 
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ruble in Belarus will be a blessing for the Belarussian economy." 
(KOMMERSANT 2 Oct 03; WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, 2 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
It seems that there are only two possible ways of ever making a Russian-
Belarussian Union work. The first one is to fulfill Lukashenka's demands: give 
him cheap Russian gas and nurture his prospects of gaining the presidency of 
the Union in 2008. Needless to say, the latter is very unlikely. Russia is not 
without options, however; they could always reconfigure the Union as a 
'Lukashenka free zone.' 
 
And yet another arrest… 
The OSCE expressed its concern about a Belarussian government campaign 
against non-governmental organizations. Last week, members of a human rights 
organization "Vesna 96" ("Spring 96") were arrested in Minsk. Vesna-96 
members had organized a sit-in strike at the Belarussian Supreme Court, which 
recently confirmed a decision on the dissolution of the organization. The OSCE 
called the recent development a "serious regress." (RADIO LIBERTY, 30 Oct 03) 
 
UKRAINE 
Testing the ground… 
A bitter dispute between Ukraine and Russia continues over Tuzla, an island in 
the Kerch Strait, which separates the Taman Peninsula from Crimea. At the end 
of September, 2003 the Russians began constructing a dam between the 
Russian mainland (Krasnodar Territory) and Ukrainian Tuzla Island. The Russian 
side claims that the purpose of the dam is to restore the ecological balance, as 
this spit of land was blown away by a storm in 1925. Ukrainians, of course, view 
it as an attempt to annex Ukrainian territory, since, should the dam be completed, 
Tuzla will become Russian territory according to international law. Even though 
dam construction is said to be initiated solely by the Krasnodar Territory governor 
Aleksandr Tkachev, this move bears the mark of Russian central planning. 
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Russia, it seems, has several goals in mind as it encroaches on Ukrainian 
territory. 
 
First, there is the factor of economic influence and control over economic 
resources. Russia has recently articulated its ambitions for creating a "liberal 
empire" in the post-Soviet space. In particular, UES Chief Anatoli Chubais 
recently expressed his hopes that Russia would be able to participate in the 
privatization of the Ukrainian regional energy distributing companies, effectively 
gaining control over Ukraine's energy sector. The Kerch Strait dispute fits this 
pattern of gradual economic expansion into the territories of the former Soviet 
republics. More than a hundred oil and natural gas deposits have been 
discovered in the Azov Sea, which Russia would be able to explore. (RFE/RL 29 
Oct 03) In addition, Moscow is not thrilled about paying over a million dollars per 
year in fees for its ships to be able to pass through the Kerch Strait. If the dam is 
constructed, the situation may be reversed, bringing toll revenue into Russia. 
Economic benefits and influence are a side prize, however. It was certainly not 
the reason for starting the dam's construction. 
 
A more likely reason is Moscow 's desire to test the ground of how far Ukraine 
will go to protect its territorial sovereignty and to see how much concern the 
border dispute will raise in the West. British Military Expert James Sherr said that 
Russia pressed on with dam construction in order to "ascertain whether the West 
is so distracted by what is going on in Iraq, the friction between Europe and 
America, the problems of terrorism and economic problems that it will not notice 
what is happening over Tuzla. It is an experiment." (DEN 28 Oct 03; BBC 
MONITORING, 30 Oct 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Indeed, it seems odd that Russia 
suddenly decided to "restore ecological balance" after eighty years of ignoring it. 
So far, there has not been much reaction from the West and it does not look as if 
the West will intervene in this conflict. 
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Yet another possible reason for starting dam's construction is the upcoming 
Russian presidential elections in 2004. By appealing to the allegedly deep-rooted 
feeling among Russian citizens of grief about the loss of empire, Putin might be 
trying to raise his popularity by effectively restoring the empire. Despite all the 
commotion, however, it does not look as if Russia would be prepared to "throw a 
bomb" at Ukraine, as it has jokingly threatened, or to let the conflict escalate to a 
military phase. But it certainly does appear to be challenging the notion of 
Ukraine's independence. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
Armenia 
On 22 October, Armenian Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan and United Energy 
System (UES) CEO Anatoli Chubais signed an agreement that solidified the 
transfer of 80% of Armenia’s energy sector to UES. (MEDIAMAX, 23 Oct. 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-1022 via World News Connection) At present, UES operates the 
Sevan-Hrazdan Cascade hydro plant, manages the Armenian NPP and expects 
to manage the Hrazdan thermal power plant soon. (ARKA News Agency, 24 Oct. 
03 via ISI Emerging Databases) The commanding influence UES wields in the 
Armenian energy sector indicates the far-reaching plans Chubais harbors for the 
region and places him but one step closer to the creation of a Russian, or UES, 
dominated Caucasian energy bloc. However, according to Chubais, the 
ostensible objective of this "united energy system" is the resolution of political 
disputes in the region, particularly focusing on the Armenian-Azerbaijani disgust 
over Nagorno-Karabakh. (ITAR-TASS, 22 Oct. 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1022 via 
World News Connection) He added that the synchronization of the energy 
systems of Armenia and Azerbaijan will open new possibilities for energy export 
not only between these two countries but also to "third countries," a clear 
reference to the as yet unrecognized republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. (ARKA 
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News Wire, 24 Oct. 03 via ISI Emerging Databases) Indeed, the Armenian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Ruben Shugarian has claimed also that stronger 
economic ties may pave the road to a constructive dialogue between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia, a view quickly refuted by Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Vilayat 
Guliyev (INTERFAX, 24 Oct. 03), but subsequently considered tacitly by the 
Azerbaijani government, as indicated by the meeting of Shugarian and 
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev on 31 October at the Baku Economic 
Conference. (MEDIAMAX, 30 Oct. 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1030 via World News 
Connection) The ambivalent Azerbaijani stance regarding relations with Armenia 
and an integrated economic zone demonstrate both the amorphous nature of 
Ilham Aliev’s initial foreign policy forays and the current instability in the 
Azerbaijani government. These two factors could prove providential for Armenia 
in future discourse with the new Aliev regime. 
 
Georgia 
On 2 November, Georgia conducted parliamentary elections, with immediate 
results unclear, since official tallies contrasted sharply with the parallel vote 
tabulations conducted by independent monitoring organizations. Amid charges of 
fraud, both opposition and pro-government parties have claimed victory; 
competing poll results indicate uncertainty concerning Georgia’s political 
landscape. This landmark election marks the first step of a difficult transition that 
is expected to culminate with Eduard Shevardnadze's departure from the 
Presidency in 2005. 
 
Preliminary election results released by the Central Election Commission (CEC) 
confirmed that six political parties had passed the required 7% vote-hurdle to win 
seats in the next parliament. The For a New Georgia pro-government bloc, led by 
Vazha Lordkipadnadze, led the CEC count with 27% (BBC News, 3 Nov 03) and 
the radical opposition National Movement bloc, led by Mikheil Saakashvili, was 
reported, thus far, to have garnered 22.6%. 
(www.eurasianet.org/departments/articles/eav110303) These CEC reports 
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contrasted sharply with two parallel vote counts conducted by Fair Elections, 
Georgia’s leading monitoring group, and Global Strategy Group, a U.S. firm. Both 
organizations stated that exit polls indicated that the National movement bloc 
was leading with about 26% of the vote, and the For a New Georgia bloc was 
trailing with only 19%. (Ibid) 
 
The electoral process was marred by widespread irregularities leading to the 
suspension of voting in at least ten polling stations throughout the country. (BBC 
MONITORING, 2 Nov 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Voting irregularities included 
intimidation or exclusion of accredited monitors, voting without proper 
identification, a complete absence of ballot papers in 25 precincts of Kutaisi (THE 
GUARDIAN, 2 Nov 03), an absence of computerized voting lists in Tbilisi, the 
hijacking of ballot boxes in Rustavi by pro-government police, and reports of pro-
government MPs attempting to influence local election commission officials. 
(SARKE-NEWS, 2 Nov 03 via ISI Emerging Databases) Although these incidents 
led international observers, most predominantly the OSCE’s head observer 
Bruce George, to condemn the elections and question the capacity of the 
government to run a credible election (SARKE-DAILY NEWS, 3 Nov 03 via 
Lexis-Nexis), many observers noted the marked improvements compared with 
the past, such as the increased transparency of the CEC’s methods and the 
introduction of a new unified electoral code. (AGENCE PRESSE FRANCE, 2 Nov 
03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The preliminary results favoring the National Movement bloc, as reported by non-
CEC groups, indicate that many Georgians blame President Eduard 
Shevardnadze for Georgia’s most pressing problems, which include the on-going 
economic crisis catalyzed by the suspension of IMF cooperation in September, 
the strained relationship with Russia, and the absence of resolution of the 
Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts. Indeed, Mikheil Saakashvili of the National 
Movement campaigned on a strongly anti-Shevardnadze platform, demanding 
economic reform and a quick, strong resolution of the Abkhaz conflict. 
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(WWW.RFERL.ORG/nca/features/2003/10/30102003180347.asp) Although 
deemed too incendiary by other opposition leaders, his rhetoric has yielded 
support from segments of the Georgian public, and indicates the distrust that 
prevails between the population and the Shevardnadze government. If election 
results are shown to have been tampered with or corrupted in any major 
organized way, Shevardnadze’s government will face not only oppositional 
unrest, but also possible violence and destabilization. In turn, this may damage 
the chance for Georgian integration into NATO in the foreseeable future, cool 
relations with the U.S., and leave Georgia vulnerable to increasing pressure and 
penetration by Russia's political and economic hegemonic drive. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Searching for Hegemony: Russia, Turkey, and the Rewards of Ramadan 
Outsiders seeking hegemony over the region mark the history of Central Asia. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaders of the five republics have sought 
to establish and define the role of their countries in a manner most favorable to 
them. This remains the case though the security threat of terrorism has led 
Russia to reassert its role as regional hegemon. Turkey is also moving to 
increase its influence as a regional power with a long history of ethnic relations 
with the four Turkic states. But during the holy month of Ramadan, Islam also 
can be used to gain popularity. 
 
At the opening of the Russian military air base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin commented that Central Asia’s future was "directly 
linked with close cooperation with Russia… [which will] develop (relations) with 
all countries of the region." Presenting Russia as the primary "protector" of the 
region, Putin went on to add that the benefits of Russia’s military presence would 
spill over to economic development: The military would provide "an important 
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element of security in the region and create good conditions for business — 
[meaning] it is safe to work here." (ITAR-TASS, 0852 GMT, 23 Oct 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-1023 via World News Connection) Putin encouraged Russian 
businesses "more actively and boldly to take part in the economic life of 
Kyrgyzstan [because this] meets national interests of Russia." (ITAR-TASS, 0718 
GMT, 23 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1023 via World News Connection) 
 
During Putin’s visit to Kyrgyzstan, the relationship between the two countries was 
enlarged by the signing of a handful of contracts meant to spell out areas of 
Russian assistance and influence in the Kyrgyz business sphere. At an 
investment forum, four contracts worth $14 million were signed, with an 
additional $50 million in agreements held under consideration. The projects to be 
undertaken by Russian businesses include: Aeroflot’s upgrading of Lake Issyk 
Kul’s international airport; the development of Kyrgyz natural resources; and 
increased cooperation in agriculture and industry. (ITAR-TASS, 1138 GMT; 1021 
GMT, 23 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1023 via World News Connection) Respectful 
of his Russian counterpart, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev cited "allied relations 
with Russia as an important factor of regional and global security" going on to 
add that Kyrgyzstan regarded itself as "Russia’s dedicated brother" and "Russia’s 
political support base in the region." (ITAR-TASS, 0956 GMT, 23 Oct 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-1023 via World News Connection) 
 
While Russia strives to cement its authority in the region, Turkey enhances its 
influence by emphasizing the Turkic roots of much of Central Asia’s population. 
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent travels to Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan were aimed at encouraging an environment of increased economic 
cooperation. On his visit to Kyrgyzstan, he was accompanied by over 100 
Turkish businessmen wishing to capitalize on cultural affinity, linguistic 
similarities, and an inexpensive labor market. (TIMES OF CENTRAL ASIA, 31 
Oct 03 via www.times.kg) Commenting on his visit, Erdogan insisted that "we 
[Turkey] attach much importance to these lands… and we want to achieve a leap 
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in our relations." (ISTANBUL MILLIYET, 25 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1025 via 
World News Connection) At an economic level, Erdogan encouraged greater 
cooperation between Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, advocating a five-fold 
increase in trade volume to $200 million and $250 million respectively, by the end 
of 2004. (ANATOLIA, 1853 GMT, 24 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1024 via World 
News Connection) 
 
After Erdogan’s return to Turkey, Uzbek Foreign Minister Sodiq Safoyev visited 
Ankara to discuss Turkish-Uzbek military and security interests and economic 
relations. Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, Safoyev 
characterized his visit as "successful" and discussions were held in preparation 
for Erdogan’s upcoming visit to Tashkent in December of this year. (ITAR-TASS, 
0016 GMT, 29 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-1029 via World News Connection) 
Noting the influence in Central Asia of China, Russia, and the United States, 
Turkey acknowledged its need to be more active and multidimensional in its 
policy in the region, if it is to achieve contemporary rather than historical 
influence. 
 
Yet another element seeking influence in the region appears under the umbrella 
of Islam. The influence of terrorist organizations with an Islamic "ideological" 
framework is something that the SCO anti-terrorist efforts are designed to 
address, but, during the holy month of Ramadan, the Tajik and Turkmen 
presidents have sought to harvest political popularity and influence by taking 
advantage of Islam’s popular support base. 
 
Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov greeted his country at the beginning of 
Ramadan by encouraging the population to use Ramadan as an occasion to 
reflect upon and act according to the "human purposes" of Islam and thus 
denounce acts of terrorism. (ITAR-TASS, 0801 GMT, 25 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-
2003-1025 via World News Connection) To mark the celebration and thereby 
secure at least momentary popularity, the Tajik government has, for the month of 
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Ramadan, temporarily resumed the supply of natural gas to Dushanbe homes 
that had been cut off for non-payment. (ITAR-TASS, 1112 GMT, 28 Oct 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-1028 via World News Connection) 
 
For his part, Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov started the observance of 
Ramadan by pardoning over 7000 prisoners. Since 1991 he has pardoned over 
120,000 convicts, often around holidays, thereby allowing the convicts to spend 
time with their families. (ITAR-TASS, 1215 GMT, 24 Oct 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
1024 via World News Connection) 
 
Whether it be the occasion of Ramadan, the fear of militant Islam and terrorism, 
or the development of business deals aimed at improving economic stability, the 
struggle for influence in Central Asia is ongoing. And the reality of the situation is 
that hegemonic power is likely to be shared among a number of actors with 
puissant interests in the region. 
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